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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal arises out of the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals (hereinafter respectively "Massey" and
"Capitol West," and collectively the "Massey Defendants").
The Massey Defendants contend that: (1) the District Court correctly ruled that the
Defendants did not owe the Plaintiff a tort duty upon which to predicate its professional
negligence cause of action; (2) the District Court did not rely on evidence not in the record; and
(3) there were no genuine issues of material fact so as to preclude judgment as a matter of law in
favor of the Massey Defendants.

The Massey Defendants therefore respectfully urge the

Supreme Court to affirm the District Court's judgment.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on April 12, 2010, in the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, County of Canyon. R Vol. I, p. 6-11. The Complaint alleged professional
negligence, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. R Vol. I, p. 6-11. Thereafter,
the parties engaged in written discovery and on May 17, 2011, deposed Massey and Plaintiffs
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b )(6) designee, Connie Miller.I
The Massey Defendants moved for summary judgment on November 10, 2011. R Vol. I,
p. 17-180. The Plaintiff, in tum, moved for summary judgment on November 15, 2011. R Vol.
1 As of May 17, 2011, Connie Miller was President/CEO of Icon Federal Credit Union, which
subrogated its claims to Plaintiff. The Plaintiff, therefore, "stands in the shoes" of Icon, f/n/a
"Idahy".
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I, p. 129-130. The District Court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment on
February 9, 2012. R Vol. II, p. 194-205. At that hearing, the District Court advised counsel for
the Massey Defendants that it did not have a copy of the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, which the
Massey Defendants had referenced over a dozen times in their supporting memorandum. R Vol.
II, p. 194-205; R Vol. I, p. 113-128; Tr., February 9, 2012 hearing, p. 5-8. Counsel for the
Plaintiff stated that he "believe[ d]" he had a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit and stipulated to
admitting into the record. Tr., February 9, 2012 hearing, p. 5-6.
In its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment dated February 17, 2012, the District
Comi granted summary judgment in favor of the Massey Defendants, dismissing the Plaintiffs
causes of action. R Vol. II, p. 194-205. Accordingly, the District Court stated that it did not
need to reach Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.2 R Vol. II, p. 204.
On March 1, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the District Court's
Orders on Motions for Summary Judgment, arguing that material issues of fact precluded
summary judgment. R Vol. II, p. 206-216. The District Court signed a Judgment dismissing the
Plaintiffs claims with prejudice on March 15, 2012, and on March 22, 2012, the Massey
Defendants filed a Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees. R Vol. II, p. 217-219. In its Order
dated April 10, 2012, the District Court denied the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. R vol.

2 Without citing to the record, the Plaintiff asserts on page 20 of its brief that the District Court
did not "read" the Plaintiffs summary judgment papers. Counsel for the Massey Defendants
cannot locate in the record where the District Court ever stated not "reading" the Plaintiffs
moving papers. The District Court, however, did rule in its Order granting summary judgment in
favor the Massey Defendants that it did not to "need reach" the Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. The fact that the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was rendered moot by the
District Court's ruling is not equivalent to not "reading" the Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment.
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II, p. 260-269. On April 19, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie
Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's
Order Granting Summary Judgment (hereinafter the "Renewed Motion to Reconsider"). R Vol.
II, p. 270-275. In support of the Renewed Motion to Reconsider, the Plaintiff also filed the
Affidavits of Patrick J. Collins and Jeffrey M. Wilson, which attested that neither had a copy of
the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca that attorney Wilson previously had stipulated to the admission
of into the record. R Vol. II, p. 276-285.After hearing from the parties on May 10, 2012, the
District Court denied the Plaintiffs Renewed Motion. Tr., May 10, 2012 hearing, p. 30-31. It
also awarded Defendants Massey costs, but declined to award attorneys' fees. A Supplemental
Judgment was filed on June 21, 2012, and this appeal followed.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 13, 2007, Defendant Wade Massey ("Massey") performed an appraisal

of the real property located at 16462 Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho 83607 for Clearwater
Mortgage Inc. (the "Appraisal"). R Vol. I, p. 115. The Appraisal report identified Clearwater
Mortgage as the "intended user," and Massey initially prepared it exclusively for that company
to aid in its decision whether to extend Steven and Valerie Hruza ("Hruza") a loan. R Vol. I, p.
115. Massey never thought that Idahy Federal Credit Union ("ldahy"), which now is known as
Icon Federal Credit Union ("Icon"), was his client. R Vol. I, p. 115. In fact, Massey never
communicated with anyone at ldahy about anything, including the appraisal. R Vol. I, p. 115.
Nor did Massey know that Idahy had obtained a copy of the Appraisal until he was served the
Complaint. R Vol. I, p. 115.
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Massey emailed the draft copy of the Appraisal report to Cleaiwater Mortgage. R. Vol. I, p.
115. Because the report was in preliminary draft fmm, Clearwater Mortgage did not rely upon it in its
decision whether to loan Hruza money. R Vol. I, p. 115.. Cleaiwater Mortgage declined Hruza's loan
application for reasons independent of the Appraisal. R Vol. I, p 116. Because Cleaiwater Mortgage
declined Hruza's loan application, the President of Cleaiwater Mortgage, Ernie Menchaca and Massey
decided that, in lieu of revising and completing the Appraisal, the Massey Defendants would forego any
payment for the services provided. R Vol. I, p. 116.
In or about September 2007, Idahy extended a loan to Hruza, which was secured by a second
position secwity interest on their personal residence. R Vol. I, p. 116. Idahy claims to have relied on the
Appraisal report, which stated that the value of Hruza's prope1iy was $1,150,000, but Idahy does not
know how it obtained a copy of the Appraisal. R Vol. I, p. 116. Idahy never requested a letter of
assignment from Cleaiwater Mortgage, Inc. to use or rely on the Appraisal, which is customary in the
industry. R Vol I, p. 116.
The Hruzas defaulted almost immediately.

R Vol. I, p. 116. Hruza filed for Chapter 7

bankruptcy protection on or about July 22, 2008. R Vol I, p. 116. Plaintiff, the fidelity bond insurer for
Idahy, paid Idahy after Hruza's default. R Vol I, p. 116.

D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court applies the same standard

ofreview that the District Court did. See Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,
441, 235 P.3d 387, 391 (2010). Thepartymovingforsummaryjudgmentinitiallycarriestheburden
to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a
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matter oflaw. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct App. 1992). A mere scintilla
of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge
v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). There must be evidence upon which
a jury could rely, see Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595,495 P.2d 1 (1972), and evidence that gives rise to
only the slightest doubt as to the facts does not preclude summary judgment. Tri-State Nat 7 Bank v.

Westem Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543,447 P.2d 409 (1968).
Moreover, it is well established that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought
"may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence
by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine
issue of material fact." Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 1285 (1990); Clarke v.

Prenger, 114 Idaho 766, 760 P.2d 1182 (1988);Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238
(1986).

II.
RESPONDENTS' RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES THAT
HA VE BEEN PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY THE PLAINTIFF
1.

The District Court did not err in ruling that the Massey Defendants, who never
communicated with Idahy, and which does not know how it obtained the Appraisal, did
not owe a legal duty to Idahy.

2.

The Plaintiff was bound to its open court stipulation into the record of the Menchaca
Affidavit.

Alternatively, the Plaintiff invited error by stipulating to the admission of

Menchaca Affidavit when it knew or should have known it lacked a copy of the
document.
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3.

The District Court did not rely upon disputed material facts or draw impem1issible
inferences therefrom when it ruled that the Massey Defendants did not owe the Plaintiff a
legal duty upon which to base its professional negligence claim.

4.

The Massey Defendants respectfully request that the Supreme Court award them
attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

54(e)(l).
III.
ARGUMENT
This is a professional negligence case.

What makes this professional negligence

litigation unique are the following undisputed facts:
Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal. R Vol. I, p. 110-112;
Affidavit of Joe Huffman.3
ldahy was not a Client of Massey. R. Vol. I, p. 110-112; Affidavit ofJoe Huffinan.
There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy. R Vol. I, p. 110112; Affidavit of Joe Huffman.

Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know Idahy had received a
copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Hruzas, ah-eady had defaulted. R Vol.
I, p. 110-112; Affidavit ofJoe Huffman.
•

IdahydoesnotknowhowitobtainedMassey'sAppraisal. R Vol. I, p. 62-63; Affidavit
of Joe Huffman.

3 The District Court Clerk inadvertently omitted the Affidavit of Joe Huffman from the Record
on Appeal. The Massey Defendants have filed a Motion to Augment the Record to include the
Affidavit which has been granted by this Court.
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•

As between Massey and his Client/Intended User, Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., the Appraisal
was an incomplete or inchoate work product that was not be relied upon. R Vol. I, p.
110-111; R Vol. II, p. 192-193.
The Appraisal was not assigned to Idahy.

Based on these undisputed facts, the District Court correctly ruled that the Plaintiffs case lacked
merit as a matter of law because the Massey Defendants did not owe the Plaintiff a legal duty. The
Plaintiffs theory reduces to the absurd proposition that an appraiser owes a tort duty to an undefined
and potentially limitless class ofthird-pa:tiynon-clients simply because they improperly obtained relied
on a report that was intended for another, and which was undeniably rescinded by the parties who
contemplated it.

A.

The District Court Correctlv Ruled that Massey Did Not Owe Idahy a Dutv
Upon Which to Predicate its Professional Negligence Claim.

The elements for a negligence cause of action are: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and
(4) damages. See Black Canyon Raquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 199 Idaho 171,
175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-06 (1991 ). The fundamental threshold element in a negligence action
is the existence of a duty owed to another. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho
32, 39, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975)(emphasis added). It is well settled law that in Idaho "statutes
and administrative regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that
violations of such statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se. "Sanchez v. Galey,
112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986). To form the basis for a negligence per se
theory, the statute or regulation must: "( 1) clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2)
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the statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act
or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or
regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of
the injury." Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986); see also Stott

By and Through Dougall v. Finney, 130 Idaho 894, 950 P.2d 709 (1997).
Applying these principls to the undisputed facts compel only one reasonable conclusion:
the Massey Defendants did not owe, assume or undertake any duty to Idahy whether arising out
of common law principles or based on the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
(hereinafter "USPAP"). 4 To find a professional duty in these circumstances, where there was no
professional relationship, privity or communication would be unprecedented, unwarranted and
countervailing to all tort principles of law.
1.

The Plaintiff is Not a Member of the Class of Persons that USP AP
Was Designed to Protect.

The Plaintiff contends on appeal that the District Co mi erred because it allegedly failed to
consider USP AP and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA). This argument misses the mark. The Plaintiff fails to inform the Supreme Court that
in their opposition papers to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Massey Defendants
submitted the Affidavit of Joe Huffman. Mr. Huffman's affidavit is the only expert evidence in
the record demonstrating that Idahy was not a "Client" of Massey or an "Intended User" of the
Appraisal report as defined by USP AP, and that any reliance on the Appraisal report by Idahy
was improper.
4 Idaho adopted USPAP. See l.D.A.P.A. § 24.18.01.004.
MASSEY RESPONDENTS' BRIEF-PAGE 10

Indeed, application of the undisputed facts to the relevant provisions of USP AP proves
that Massey did not owe a duty to Idahy to conform with the standards of practice prescribed
therein. The linchpin to this argument is simple: as defined by USP AP, Idahy was neither a
Client of Massey nor an Intended User of the inchoate appraisal. Furthermore, there was no
appraisal "report" that was "transmitted" to Idahy.

The District Court did not error in so

concluding.
USP AP defines a "Client" to be the party or parties who engage the appraiser (by
employment or contract) in a specific assignment. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at

il 5(b ).

The

Client is the party with whom the appraiser has an "appraiser-client relationship ... ."See id. In
this case, Idahy was not Massey's Client under USPAP, and, significantly, Massey and Idahy
never communicated with each other about the Appraisal or anything else. R Vol. I, p. 110-112
Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at

iii! 7,

8. Massey did not even know Idahy had obtained a copy of

the inchoate Appraisal until he was served the Complaint. R Vol. I, p. 110-112. As to Massey,
ldahy could have been anybody (and everybody) in the world. Massey did not owe Idahy a duty
of care as contemplated by USP AP, as Idahy is no more "a member of the class of persons the
statute or regulation was designed to protect" as any other person who somehow gets a hold of
an appraiser's cast-off work product drafts without authorization. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho at
617, 733 P.2d at 1242. The District Court correctly appreciated these facts and principles, and,
as a result, correctly held that Massey did not owe or assume any duty towards Idahy.
This is further supported by the fact Idahy was not an Intended User of the inchoate
appraisal. An "Intended User" is the client and any other party as identified, by name or type, as
users of the appraisal ... on the basis of communication with the client at the time of the
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assignment. " 5See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at

ii 5(c) (emphasis added). Idahy was not the

Client, as explained above, and was not identified in any manner as a user of the inchoate
appraiser "on the basis of communication with client [Clearwater] at the time of the assignment."
R Vol. I, p. 110-112 & Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 8. Furthermore, the inchoate appraisal was
not assigned or otherwise transferred to Idahy. R Vol. II, p. 192-193. Incredibly, Idahy does not
even know how it obtained a copy of the inchoate appraisal, yet still insists it is entitled to
damages from Massey. R Vol. I, p. 62-63.
Nor does the fact Idahy sent Massey a check after escrow closed on the Hruza loan alter
the analysis.

USP AP defines "Assignment" to be a "a valuation service provided as a

consequence of an agreement between an appraiser and a client." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman,
at ii 5( a). Under USP AP, the check or any payment is irrelevant, and did not retroactively create
an appraiser/client relationship or duty as between Idahy and Massey. First, Idahy sent the check
after it decided to loan the Hruzas the money6. R Vol. II, p. 174-176. Second, Massey only
learned about the check after the fact. R Vol. II, p. 172. And third, USP AP clearly provides that
it is the engagement, not payment, which gives rise to the client-appraiser relationship. 7See
Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ill 0. As discussed above, there was no communication between
Idahy and Massey, let alone "Assignment." As such, there is no relationship from which a

5

USP AP defines "Assignment" to be a "a valuation service provided as a
consequence of an agreement between an appraiser and a client. See Affidavit of Joe
Huffman, at ii 5(a).
6

The check is dated 5 days after the settlement Statement.

7

Notably, USP AP's position on how payment is irrelevant to the creation of an
appraiser-client relationship is analogous to Massey's contention that there is no contract
with Idahy because, among other reasons, there was no bargained for consideration.
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breach could occur.
Moreover, there was not an appraisal "Report," as that term is defined by USPAP, upon
which to base the Plaintiff's causes of action. The fact that Idahy improperly obtained a copy of
the appraisal does not mean it was entitled to rely on it anymore than a person who pulls a
lawyer's draft opinion letter opining on the legality of a tax strategy from the garbage receptacle.
USP AP defines "Report" to mean "any communication, written or oral, of an appraisal,
appraisal review, or appraisal consulting service that is transmitted to the client upon completion
of an assignment." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at if 5(e). First, as analyzed above, there was
no "Assignment" as between Idahy and Massey, as they never communicated with one another
about anything, let alone forged an agreement.

Therefore, there was no appraisal/client

relationship upon which to predicate a claim based on a breach of standards of practice. Second,
there was no "completion" of the "Assignment" between Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. because it
and Massey mutually rescinded it. See, e.g., Pitner v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 94 Idaho 496,
491P.2d1268 (1971)(A contract may be rescinded by mutual consent of the contracting parties).
Third, Idahy was not a "Client." And fourth, the only evidence on point, the Affidavit of Ernie
Menchaca, establishes that the Client, Clearwater, did not "transmit" or assign the appraisal
draft. R Vol. II, p. 192-193. The Plaintiff cannot fail to controvert this evidence and expect to
survive a motion for summary judgment. See Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d
1285 (1990) (stating that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought "may not merely
rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by way of
deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the contradict the assertions of the moving party").
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2.

The Plaintiff Did Not Request the Court to Apply the Balance of
Harms Test, But Even if it Had, the Test Demonstrates that the
Massey Defendants Did Not Owe the Plaintiff a Legal Duty.

On appeal the Plaintiff asserts for the first time that the District Court should have applied
the balance of harms test to determine if the Massey Defendants owed the Plaintiff a tort duty.
Because the Plaintiff did not raise this issue at the District Court, it is waived.
"Substantive issues will not be considered the first time on appeal." Crowley v.

Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 438 (2007). A party cannot "remain silent as to
claimed error during a trial and later urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal."

Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357 (1982). Failing to object to actions
the District Court takes bars the party from challenging the District Court's action on appeal.

See ,Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.3d 504, 506 (2009).
The Massey Defendants, but not the Plaintiff, urged the District Court to apply the
balance of harms test. None of the Plaintiff's briefing appears to request the District Court to
apply the balance of harms test or refute the Massey Defendants' discussion of the test. In fact,
the Plaintiff's briefing largely, if not entirely, ignores the key issue in this case, which is whether
the Massey Defendants owed a tort duty to a lender with whom Massey had never communicated
and which lender does not even know how it obtained the inchoate appraisal repo1i. Therefore,
the Plaintiff waived the issue of whether the District Court erred in not applying the balance of
harms test. See Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho at 512, 181 P.3d at 438.
Even if the Plaintiff had not waived the balance of harms issue, the Massey Defendants
owed the Plaintiff no duty under that test. In analyzing whether "to recognize a new duty or extend
a duty beyond the scope previously imposed," the Supreme Court engages in a balance-of-the-harms test.
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Vincent v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAm., 136 Idaho 107,29 P.3d 943 (2001). The balance of harms test involves
the consideration of

policy and the weighing of factors, which include: the foreseeability of the harm to the
plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct; the policy of preventing future harm; the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach; and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved. Id.
Applying these factors, the Massey Defendants did not owe Idahy, Plaintiff's subrogor, a duty of
care. First, at the time Massey was preparing the appraisal, there was no foreseeability of harm to ldahy
because Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. was Massey's client. R Vol. I, p. 110-112. It is undisputed that the
appraisal did not identify Idahyas the "Intended User." R Vol. I, p. 110-112 & Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ir
8. It is also undeniable that Massey never contemplated Idahy to be his client.R Vol. I, p. 110-112.
Similarly, it is undisputed that Massey did not lmow that Idahy had received a copy of the appraisal, or as
alleged by Plaintiff, that Idahy relied on it in making the loan to Hrnza, until well after the September 13,
2007 close of escrow. R Vol. I, p. 110-112. Nor was there an assignment of the appraisal. R Vol. II, p. 192193. Simply put, the Massey Defendants could not have foreseen any harm to Idahy because at the time of
preparing the appraisal, Idahy was not within the contemplation of the Massey Defendants. See id.
Nor can a cogent argwnent be made that the Massey Defendants should have foreseen any ham1 to
anybody. Based on his conversation with Mr. Menchaca, who was at all relevant times the president and
CEO of Clearwater Mortgage, Massey understood the Appraisal to be inchoate and never to be completed,
revised or finalized. R Vol. I, p. 110-11. Because Massey never contemplated that the inchoate Appraisal
would be used or relied upon by anyone, it follows that it was not foreseeable that anyone would be
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harmed by it.
Other factors of the balance of harms test also demonstrate that the Massey Defendants did not owe
any duty to Idahy. Because the appraisal was nothing more than an incomplete and preliminary draft, it
follows, a fortiori, that the Massey Defendants could not have had any inkling, let alone a "degree of
certainty," that Idahy or any other lender would suffer injury by way of the appraisal. Moreover, if
Idahy had followed industry custom, it would have sought an assignment, at which point it
would have learned there was no appraisal report to assign. R Vol. II, p. 192-193; Affidavit of Joe
Hu:ffi11an at ~12.
For the same reasons, no moral blame can be attached to the Massey Defendants' conduct. The
appraisal was nothing more than an incomplete draft that was not to be used or relied upon. R Vol. I, p.
110-112; R Vol. II, p. 192-193. While moral blame might exist if an appraiser intentionally put a defective
appraisal into the stream of commerce intending that third-parties rely on it, there can be no moral blame for
deciding, along with one's Client, not to complete the Appraisal.

In sum, the Plaintiff waived any argument that the District Court erred in purportedly failing to
apply the balance of harms test. But even if Plaintiff had not waived this issue, the Massey Defendants
did not owe Idahy a duty of care under the balance of harms test.
This conclusion accords with authority in other jurisdictions holding that, absent privity of
contract, an appraiser cannot be liable for negligently preparing an appraisal relied on by a third-party who is
not within a definable, fixed or contemplated assignment to the recipient. See, e.g., Webb v. Leclair, 933
A.2d 177, 183 (Vt. 2007)(holding that appraiser did not owe duty to purchaser under negligence and
negligent misrepresentation theory because no privity existed); Decatur Ventures, LLC v. Daniel, 485 F.3d
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387, 390 (7th Cir. 2007)(under Indiana law real estate appraiser does not owe duty of care to buyer who the
appraiser did not know, was not his client and was not a third-party beneficiary of contract between
appraiser and client); Christiansen v. Roddy, 186 Cal.App.3d 780 (1986)(holding that appraiser did not owe
duty of care to investors for whom the appraisal was not performed and where there was no evidence
appraiser !mew or aware of the investors).
B.

The Plaintiff Was Bound to Its Open Court Stipulation Into the Record of
the Menchaca Affidavit. Alternativelv, the Plaintiff Invited Error by
Stipulating to the Admission of Menchaca Affidavit When it Knew or Should
Have Known it Lacked a Copv of the Document.

The Plaintiff incorrectly and misleadingly contends that the District Court relied on
evidence not in the record, namely the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. The reality is that Plaintiff
is bound to its attorney's open court stipulation to the admissibility of the Affidavit of Ernie
Menchaca. Alternatively, the Plaintiff's attorneys invited error by so stipulating and, as such, is
barred from arguing that the District Court erred in relying on the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca.
Contrary to Plaintiffs argument on appeal, Mr. Menchaca's affidavit was in the record.
After the District Court advised counsel that she did not have a copy of it, which the Massey
Defendants cited to fourteen (14) times in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Plaintiff's counsel stipulated to its admission at the February 9, 2013, hearing.
When the District Court asked whether Mr. Wilson had received it, he replied that he "believed
so" and invited counsel for the Massey Defendants to "augment the record." See Tr. February 9,
2012, hearing, at 5-6.

A stipulation such as this, which was made in an open court, is final. See

Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982). The

affidavit was in the District Court records within hours of the hearing. And the only reason a copy was
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not served on the Plaintiffs attorneys was because of Mr. Wilson's representation that he believed he
had a copy of it.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs innuendo laced argument that it was denied access to the Menchaca
affidavit is, again, misleading and disingenuous.

Admittedly, it .!§ likely the Affidavit of Ernie

Menchaca was not served in accordance with Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b )(1) with the Massey
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. But counsel for the Massey Defendants did not know
this until the February 9, 2012, hearing. Despite it being referenced over a dozen times in the Massey
Defendants' supporting memorandum, which undoubtedly led the District Court to search for it,8 and
should have alerted both of Plaintiffs attorneys that they lacked all the papers, neither of the Plaintiffs
two law :fin11S ever advised Massey's attorney of the issue. Tr., May 10, 2012 hearing, p. 30-31, 11. 203.

More importantly, after the February 9, 2012, hearing, neither Mr. Wilson nor Mr. Coldwell

contacted Massey's counsel to advise that they in fact did not have the Menchaca Affidavit. As such, a
copy was not served on either attorney after the hearing because Mr. Wilson previously had indicated
that he had a copy. With these facts, the Supreme Court should hold the Plaintiffs attorneys to their
stipulation.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff's attorneys invited error by stipulating to the admission of the
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, and, as such, cannot be heard to complain about it on appeal. "It has
long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced
in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible." Taylor v.

McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642, 649 (2010), quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho

8 Notably, the District Court found no merit in the Plaintiffs counsel's contention that it was
denied access to the Affidavit, noting "[t]here is no indication whatsoever that it was withheld."
Tr. May 10, 2012 hearing, p. 26-27, II. 25-6.
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836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983).
Here, the Plaintiffs attorney invited error by encouraging and inviting the District Court
to admit into evidence the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. Notably, the Plaintiff is not seeking
relief under the so-called attorney incompetence exception to the invited eITor doctrine
recognized in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 119 (Colo. 2002).
Nor is the Plaintiff seeking relief from its stipulation. Instead, the Plaintiff is accusing the
District Court of relying on evidence that they contend was not in the record, which is manifestly
false.

For the foregoing reasons the Plaintiff is bound to its attorney's stipulation to the

admissibility of the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca.

C.

The District Court Did not Rely upon Disputed Material Facts or Draw
Impermissible Inferences Therefrom When It Ruled that the Massey
Defendants Did Not Owe the Plaintiff a Legal Duty Upon Which to Base its
Professional Negligence Claim.

The Plaintiff asserts on appeal that the District Court relied on "impermissible findings of
fact" and made "improper inferences" in ruling that the Massey Defendants did not owe the
Plaintiff a tort duty.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the District Court (1) did not

consider Massey's acceptance of payment from Idahy; and (2) improperly relied on testimony by
Icon President Connie Miller in which she informed defense counsel at the 30(b )(6) deposition of
the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff did not know how it obtained a copy of the Massey's inchoate and
incomplete appraisal.
The Plaintiff is wrong. First, as demonstrated below, the District Court was aware that
Massey's bookkeeper cashed a check from Idahy after the close of escrow on the Hruza loan.
But the check was legally and factually iITelevant because it was not consideration for any
professional services, did not indicate what it was for, or identify the property name. Second,
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Connie Miller's deposition was a 30(b )(6) deposition of the Plaintiff. She knew her testimony
was and is binding on the Plaintiff. Any argument to the contrary is frivolous.
1.

Massev's "Acceptance" of Payment is
Irrelevant.

Legally and Factually

The Plaintiff's argument that the District Court erred in finding that the Massey
Defendants did not owe a legal duty to the Plaintiff despite the Massey Defendants having
accepted an $800.00 check from Idahy is unavailing. First, as discussed in more detail above,
USP AP defines "Assignment" to be a "a valuation service provided as a consequence of an
agreement between an appraiser and a client." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at

ir 5(a).

Under

USP AP, the check or any payment is irrelevant, and did not create an appraiser/client
relationship or duty as between Idahy and Massey. Second, Idahy sent the check after it already
had decided to loan the Bruzas the money. 9R Vol. II, p. 174-175. Third, Massey only learned about
the check after the fact and did not personally cash it. R Vol. II, p. 172. Fourth, the check lacks
any information identifying the property to which it pertains. R Vol. II, p. 17 4. Thus, it provides
no reason for anyone to think that Idahy relied on an appraisal that had been rescinded earlier by
Massey and Clearwater Mortgage.

As such, the District Court correctly perceived that the

$800.00 check to be the red herring that it is.

2.

The Testimony of the Plaintifrs 30(b)(6) Designee, Connie Miller, Is
Binding.

The Plaintiff wrong! y suggests that the District Court made impermissible findings of fact
and/or inferences on the issue of how Idahy obtained the appraisal by contending that its own
9

The check is dated 5 days after the settlement Statement. The proverbial cat was
already out of the bag.
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30(b)(6) designee, Connie Miller, was not really testifying on behalf of the Plaintiff.

The

argument is unavailing because Ms. Miller's testimony is binding on the Plaintiff.
In depositions noticed pursuant to 30(b )(6), "the deponent's testimony is the
corporation's testimony, and if the corporation is a party, the testimony may be used at trial by
an adverse party for any purpose." See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco
Int 'l Ltd., 253 F.R.D. 524, 525-26 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt.
C01p., 261 F.R.D. 34, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[I]t is settled law that a party need not produce the

organizational representative with the greatest lmowledge about a subject; instead, it need only
produce a person with knowledge whose testimony will be binding on the party.").
Here, the Massey Defendants noticed the 30(b )(6) deposition of the Plaintiff. R Vol. I, p.
1. The Plaintiff, in tum, designated Connie Miller to testify, including regarding how Idahy
obtained a copy of the appraisal. Ms. Miller understood that her testimony was binding on the
company, and that she was not answering questions on her own behalf. R Vol. I, at p. 58. Ms.
Miller also unequivocally testified that the company did not know how it obtained a copy of the
appraisal. R Vol. I, at 62-63. The Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the clear law and unequivocal
facts lacks merit and is frivolous.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs argument that the District Court's ruling should be reversed
because a question of material fact exists as to how Idahy obtained the appraisal also is
unavailing. It is well established that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought "may
not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by
way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine issue
of material fact." Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,791P.2d1285 (1990).
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In this instance, the Massey Defendants came forward with the following evidence relevant to how
Idahy obtained the appraisal:
Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal nor his Client under
USP AP. R Vol. I, at 110-112; Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 8.
There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy. R Vol. I, at 110112; Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 9, 10.
•

Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know ldahy had received a
copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Bruzas, already had defaulted. R Vol.
I, at 110-112.
Idahy does know how it obtained Massey's appraisal. R Vol. I, at 62-63.

•

Idahy did not obtain an assignment or transfer of the appraisal. R Vol. I, at 192193; Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 9.

It would have been improper for Idahy to rely on an appraisal supplied by the
borrowers. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 14.
Based on these facts, the District Court was on solid ground when it ruled that the
Massey Defendants did not owe a tort duty to Idahy. Faced with this evidence, the Plaintiff was
charged with adducing proof that somehow supported their theory of the case, which is
notwithstanding the facts set forth throughout this brief, that the Massey Defendants breached a
legal duty owed to the Plaintiffs subrogor. See Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d
1285. But instead of demonstrating why it would be proper to rely on an appraisal potentially provided to it
by the borrowers, or showing why you would not need to procure an assignment of the appraisal as testified
by Mr. Menchaca, the Plaintiff argues that the District Court usurped the fact-finder's role.
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The assertion simply lacks merit. The issue at the heart of the opposing motions for summary
judgment was whether the Massey Defendants owed a legal duty. Implicitly contending that they did by
arguing that the District Court usurped the fact-finder's role by seizing on a purported metaphysical
uncertainty as to how Idahy obtained the appraisal and by stating the obvious -that the appraisal was
generated by Massey for Clearwater Mortgage-- misses the issue. Of course, the appraisal came from
Clearwater Mortgage in some sense, who after all, ordered it and tl1en rescinded it. But as Massey's and
Menchaca's testin1ony establishes, it was not supposed to be released to, nor relied upon, by anybody, as
there was no assignment. Furthermore, as Mr. Huffinan testified, it would have been improper for Idahy to
rely on an appraisal provided by the bonowers. Yet despite these facts, which the Massey Defendants
adduced and provided to the District Court, the Plaintiff did nothing to establish why it should be owed a
legal duty under facts that are logically consistent with the possibility that someone at Idahy improperly
obtained the appraisal from the bonowers or retrieved it from the "garbage."

D.

Because the Plaintiffs Appeal is Frivolous, the Supreme Court Should
Award the Massey Defendants Attorneys' Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-121
and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l).

Attorneys' fees may be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54( e)(1) in cases where the Supreme Court finds the "case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation . . . ."

See Peterson v. Private

Wilderness, LLC, 152 Idaho 691, 699, 273 P.3d 1284, 1292 (2012). In an appeal, the Supreme
Court will consider the "entire course of litigation" to determine if "any legitimate issues were
presented." See id., 273 P.3d at 1292. The Supreme Court will deny attorneys' fees under these
provisions if at "least one legitimate issue was raised." See id, 273 P.3d at 1292.
Here, the Plaintiff did not raise one "legitimate issue," and, therefore, the Supreme Court

MASSEY RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PA GE 23

should award the Massey Defendants attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l). The Plaintiff's first issue, which is that the District Court
misconstrued Idaho and federal law regarding whether Massey owed the Plaintiff a duty, was
pursued frivolously and without foundation. First, at the District Court level the Plaintiff waived
any discussion about the balance of harms test. Second, the Plaintiff failed to submit evidence
(and indeed did not even meaningfully argue the issue at the District Court) supporting the
existence of a legal duty owed. The Massey Defendants, by contrast, submitted the Affidavit of
Joe Huffman, which supported their position that they did not owe the Plaintiff or its subrogor
any tort duty under USPAP. Likewise, the Massey Defendants extensively briefed and argued
the balance of harms test.
The Plaintiff's second issue, which is that the District Court relied on evidence not in the
record, specifically the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, also is frivolous.

It is factually and

demonstrably false because the Plaintiff's attorney stipulated in open court to the affidavit's
admission into the record. Moreover, the Plaintiff invited error by so stipulating when, as the
District Court implied, it should have known it lacked the affidavit and "inquir[ ed]" when they
learned as much. Tr., May 10, 2012 hearing, at 30-31, 11. 20-3.
Moreover, the Plaintiff's third issue, which is that the District Court relied on disputed
material facts, faces a similar fate. The argument that Ms. Connie Miller was speaking on her
own behalf and not Cumis's flies in the face of the facts and unequivocal law regarding 30(b)(6)
depositions. Furthermore, the balance of Plaintiff's discussion on this issue lacks foundation, as
discussed above, misconstrues and/or misapplies the standards governing motions for summary
judgment, and frivolously tries to raise an issue of material fact when there is not one.
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IV.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should affirm the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Massey Defendants. The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
why the District Court's ruling should be reversed and is owed a legal duty by the Massey
Defendants. The Massey Defendants respectfully request that the Supreme Court award them
attorneys' fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l).
Respectfully Submitted

this-~

day of March, 2013.
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